05.11.2024: Michael McMahon – Tough talk: The Fed and the risk premium

Presenter: Michael McMahon Affiliation: University of Oxford, Department of Economics. Paper: Tough Talk: The Fed and the Risk Premium. Date: November 5, 2024. Time: 13:00 GMT (15:00 Israel Time) Abstract: We study how monetary policy affects financial risk premia. Unlike existing studies, we focus on the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) forward-looking policy stance, beyond … Read more

08.10.2024: Christoph Boehm – Monetary policy without moving interest rates: The Fed non-yield shock

Presenter: Christoph E. Boehm Affiliation: University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics. Paper: Monetary Policy without Moving Interest Rates: The Fed Non-Yield Shock. Date: October 8, 2024. Time: 12:00 GMT (15:00 Israel Time) Abstract: Existing high-frequency monetary policy shocks explain surprisingly little variation in stock prices and exchange rates around FOMC announcements. Further, both … Read more

17.09.2024: Anna Cieslak – Policymakers’ uncertainty

Presenter: Anna Cieslak Affiliation: Duke University, Fuqua School of Business. Paper: Policymakers’ Uncertainty. Date: September 17, 2024. Time: 12:00 GMT (15:00 Israel Time) Abstract: We examine how uncertainty impacts decision-making by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Drawing from private deliberations, we quantify the uncertainty types the FOMC perceives and their policy impact. Inflation uncertainty … Read more

28.06.2021: Jennifer La’O – Optimal monetary policy and communication with an informationally-constrained central banker

We study optimal monetary policy and central bank communication when firms make nominal pricing decisions under uncertainty and when the monetary authority likewise has incomplete information about the current economic state. We find that the optimal monetary policy implements flexible-price allocations despite this multitude of measurability constraints; we explore a series of different implementations. Away from such policies, we find that public communication by the central bank is welfare-improving as long as either firm information or central bank information is sufficiently precise.

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